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A model of two-level politics: the case of I.R. Iran's nuclear program
Habibpour Moghaddam, Ehsan ; Tesař, Jakub (advisor) ; Karlas, Jan (referee)
This research undertakes an exploration of the intricate dynamics in foreign policy strategies between the U.S. and the Islamic Republic of Iran (I.R.), primarily focusing on the I.R.'s nuclear program. A game theory framework forms the basis of this study, helping to elucidate the complex interplay between international diplomacy, domestic political forces, and strategic decision-making mechanisms. After conducting a chronological examination of the nuclear issue, from its origins through to the ongoing negotiations, this study introduces several models. These are built upon the theoretical pillars established by De Mesquita's (2010) work on modeling I.R.-U.S. nuclear controversy and Putnam's (1988) analysis of the interplay between domestic and international politics. These models capture two significant elements: 1) the substantial influence of domestic politics within both countries on foreign policy outcomes, and 2) how shifts in each influential parameter within the model affect the outcome of the game. The study underscores how the dynamics of factors such as potential for military action, perceived power status of the involved players, and domestic political pressures critically influence each country's negotiation strategies and potential outcomes within the game's structure. Additionally,...
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